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China’s low fertility is often presented as a major factor which will
hinder its prosperity in the medium to long term. This is based on
the assumed negative consequences of an increasing old-age de-
pendency ratio: a simplistic measure of relative changing age struc-
tures. Based on this view, policies to increase fertility are being
proposed after decades of birth restriction policies. Here, we argue
that a purely age structure–based reasoning which disregards labor
force participation and education attainment may be highly mis-
leading. While fertility has indeed fallen to low levels, human capital
accumulation has been very strong—especially among younger
cohorts. Factoring in the effects of labor force participation and ed-
ucational attainment on productivity, a measure called “productivity-
weighted labor force dependency ratio” can more accurately capture
the economic implications of demographic change. When using this
ratio, a much more optimistic picture of the economic (and social)
future of China can be envisaged.
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Low fertility appears to be very much back on the scientific andpolicy agenda. Recent years have seen total fertility rates (TFRs)
in some industrialized countries reach historic lows, even in un-
expected settings such as Finland and the United States (1). Most
recent data on births and pregnancies indicate further declines in
the context of the current pandemic, with China reporting a steep
decline in births in 2020, causing great alarm in state media (2).
The standard narrative links such low fertility to increases in the
pace and scale of population aging with assumed negative con-
sequences for the economy and the sustainability of public services
as well as more fundamental issues such as gerontocracy and in-
tergenerational fairness, geopolitical strength, or even the con-
tinued existence of a culture.
Around the world, deep concerns about this “demographic
time bomb” are increasing, and the European Commission has even
appointed a Vice President for “Democracy and Demography.”
However, for governments, it is difficult to influence population
aging directly (3). Despite being generally debunked, the concept
of “replacement migration” (compensating a declining number of
younger workers through immigration) lingers as a possible solu-
tion. More commonly, though, governments have tried to stimulate
the fertility rate through more or less explicit policy interventions.
The general failure of these interventions has led to the dual meta-
phors of the “population time bomb” and the (deeply offensive)
“silver tsunami”: slow-burning yet inevitable events which will
threaten societies in the long run.
This narrative has been familiar in Europe, Japan, and other parts
of East Asia (4). Recently, however, much attention has been paid
to China’s demographic travails. Identifying Chinese fertility levels
is fraught with difficulties, with ranges being derived from different
sources and agencies (3, 5, 6). According to the China Population
and Development Center, China’s TFR in 2019 was 1.45 (7), while
evidence from the 2020 Census suggests it may have fallen to 1.3
(8)—lower than that of Japan.
In response, the Central Government has introduced a national
“three-child policy,” and various local governments have been
active in designing interventions to stimulate the fertility rate
within the existing boundaries of the policy (3). The recent re-
laxations of the birth control policies have had relatively little
impact, and fertility preference surveys reveal a sub–two-child
norm among large segments of the population (3, 9–11), in-
cluding the “floating population” of internal migrants (12). In this
context, there is little expectation that the recent relaxations to
permit more than two children per family may make any mean-
ingful change to the overall TFR.
In many analyses, this “gloomy demographic forecast” for China
is translated into economic (and even geopolitical) disaster. It is
suggested that China is “getting old before it gets rich” and may,
thus, not be able to catch up economically with the United States
as previously assumed. Some headlines even present such circum-
stances as an existential threat. One 2021 newspaper headline, for
example, declared that “Population decline could end China’s
civilization as we know it” (13).
These prognostications are partly based on a simplistic and
misleading concept of age dependency that assumes that every-
body above age 65 is an economic burden and every adult below
this age is an (equally) productive asset. The so-called “age de-
pendency ratio” (ADR) in contemporary China is around 38,
meaning there are 38 “dependents” aged over 65 or fewer than
15 per 100 “workers” aged between 15 and 64 (14). By 2050, this is
forecast to rise to 67, as high as many contemporary European
settings (1). Demographers have long argued, however, that this
measure is misleading for addressing the economic implications of
aging because it ignores dynamic changes in health and longevity
as well as in labor force participation, education, and productivity
(15). When alternative measures of aging are applied to China, the
overall picture of a “crisis” as presented by traditional measures
looks much more manageable (16–18).
Significance
China has the world’s largest national population and is rapidly
catching up with the United States in terms of having the status
as the world’s largest economy. In this context, recent reports
about unexpectedly low levels of fertility have given rise to
speculation that the resulting population stagnation/decline and
rapid aging may pose a major obstacle to continued prosperity
in the future. We show that, depending on the indicator of de-
mographic dependency used, the future may look very different.
When associated with rapid increases in human capital, low
fertility rates may not pose such a significant obstacle to con-
tinued development over the coming decades. Whether this will
be the case may have profound geopolitical and global economic
consequences.
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Considering Further Dimensions of Demographic Change
As the science that studies changing population size and struc-
tures, demography is not only concerned with age structures but
also with other societal characteristics such as changing structures
of educational attainment (19) and labor force participation by
age and sex (20). Here, we show that the future of China looks
very different if such a multidimensional demographic approach is
taken that also reflects the massive improvement of human capital
that China has experienced, and will continue to experience, be-
cause the younger generation today is already much better edu-
cated than the older generation and will replace it through the
predictable mechanism of “demographic metabolism” (21).
A recent study has taken such a multidimensional approach to
aging by stratifying the population of the (then) 28 European
Union (EU) member states by not only age and gender but also
immigration status, labor force participation, and educational at-
tainment, which is used as a proxy for productivity, reflecting the
fact that not all individuals are equally productive (20). The study
then proposes alternative measures to the ADR, such as the
“labor force dependency ratio” (LFDR) (which compares those
economically active and inactive of all ages) and a “productivity-
weighted labor force dependency ratio” (PWLFDR) (which ap-
proximates differences in productivity through wage differentials
associated with various levels of educational attainment). The
study shows that these alternative dependency measures increase
much less than the ADR, and when combined with Canadian-style
immigration policies, they even lead to a decline in economic
“dependency” in the EU over the coming decades.
When applying these alternative measures of LFDR and PWLFDR
to the future of China, the situation is complicated by significant
uncertainty about the baseline fertility measures (3, 5). As to the
future trends of the TFR, one could think of two opposing sce-
narios: 1) assuming that China will follow a similar path as South
Korea, where the TFR falls to around 0.8, and 2) that it will follow
the United Nations assumptions of a recovery to around 1.7.
Rather than taking a position on what the TFR in China will be,
we simply calculate the implications of two alternative cases—a
“high” scenario of 1.7 and a “low” scenario of 0.8.
Projections are performed with a dynamic discrete-time micro-
simulation model simulating life events of individuals (fertility,
mortality, migration, education transitions, and participation in the
labor force) with Monte Carlo experiments. The base population in
2015 is synthetically built based on the Wittgenstein Centre for
Demography and Global Human Capital (hereafter "Wittgenstein
Centre") population estimates by age, sex, and educational at-
tainment and contains about 700,000 cases (14). Assumptions in
regard to mortality (by age, sex, and education), migration (by age
and sex), and expansion of education (by cohort and sex) are those
from the medium scenario (SSP2) of the Wittgenstein Centre
projections (14), themselves built from statistical modeling of past
trends and expert judgments (SI Appendix, Table S1 for a summary
of assumptions). The model is run with two fertility assumptions,
assuming a constant TFR of either 0.8 or 1.7 children per woman
starting from 2015. The labor force participation is modeled from a
cross-sectional survey using parameters from a logit regression
(Eqs. 1–3) estimated with microdata of the Chinese General Social
Surveys (CGSS) from 2010 to 2017 (see SI Appendix, Table S2 for
model details). Those parameters are assumed to stay constant
throughout the projection. However, as the statistical model ex-
plicitly accounts for the higher propensity of working for highly
educated women (SI Appendix, Fig. S1), the expansion in education
dynamically increases the general labor force participation among
workers. The productivity weights by education level are estimated
from Poisson regression parameters on the salary variable of the
CGSS 2010 to 2017, excluding the population out of the labor force
and controlling for age, sex, and year (see Eq. 5). Those weights,
ranging from 0.36 for workers with no education to 2.03 for
workers with a postsecondary education, are used to factorize the
workers in the denominator in the calculation of the PWLFDR
(see Eq. 4).
Results
A Picture of Strongly Improving Human Capital. Fig. 1 depicts the
multidimensional demographic changes by age, sex, education,
and labor force participation that we will likely see in the human
capital of China over the upcoming decades. First, the figure
illustrates that by 2040, both fertility scenarios still yield the exact
same structures for the adult population above age 25 because
the older cohorts have already been born. However, due to the
smaller number of children, the lower fertility scenario results in
a lower ADR over the coming decades. As seen in Fig. 2, the
ADR of the low fertility scenario exceeds the one of the high
fertility scenario only around 2050. Hence, even when assessed
on the basis of the conventional ADR, lower fertility might give
China an economic boost for the next 20 years rather than being
an economic burden.
When looking at the projected trends in the LFDR, the pace
and scale of aging are slower and lower than when looking at the
ADR (Fig. 2), mainly because the increasing education of future
adult cohorts of women is likely to boost their labor force par-
ticipation. In addition, with this expected expansion of educational
attainment of the future adult population, the human capital of
the working population will improve drastically. Fig. 1 shows that,
for both scenarios, the share of the highly educated population
among workers, in dark green, is expected to be much larger in
2040 compared with 2015 simply because of the fully predictable
fact that the younger, already better educated cohorts will move
further up the age pyramid. When transposing this dynamic into
the PWLFDR (Fig. 2), there is virtually no increase in forecast
dependency up to 2070, even under the low fertility scenario.
While the total number of workers will start declining before 2025,
those with a high level of education (postsecondary) will keep
growing, as new cohorts entering the labor market are much more
educated than older ones retiring (SI Appendix, Fig. S2).
Discussion
A More Positive Outlook Based on Human Capital. Our simulations
show that indicators of dependency which take into account other
population characteristics (such as education and productivity)
present a very different, more optimistic future for China—even
under conditions of very low fertility. This is not to say that the
ongoing demographic change within China will be without diffi-
culties. China will almost certainly have challenges associated with
managing adjustments to population decline and increasing size of
the older population, in particular, if fertility should have levels of
0.8 as currently observed in South Korea (22). China does not yet
have adequate pension coverage, particularly in rural areas, and to
expand social welfare systems will be more challenging. China has
already achieved significant education expansion only rivaled by
earlier such expansions in much smaller Singapore and South
Korea, but it also needs to ensure that these increases are trans-
lated (as we assume) into higher labor force participation and
higher productivity per worker. This will require ensuring that the
current education system is fit for purpose in terms of producing
citizens with appropriate tools and skills and that both society and
the economy are properly equipped to allow the economic and
social potential of all to be fully unleashed. Numerous studies (23),
including the groundbreaking work of Rozelle et al. (24), have
identified the many challenges ahead to improving the equality of
opportunity of access to high-quality education. Increasing overall
investment to enhance the quality as well as coverage of education
across the entire country (in both rural areas and for those families
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in urban and rural areas without local household registration [hukou])
is critical to ensure that no children are left behind. Finally, under
conditions of very low fertility, the pace of overall population
decline will inevitably increase—especially at younger ages. This
will inevitably lead to the urgent reorganization of education
provision, for example. Without further reform of the labor
market to harness the higher levels of human capital, population
decline may also impact overall levels of gross domestic product as
A
B C
Fig. 1. Age pyramid by education (Low = lower than secondary, Medium = upper secondary, and High = postsecondary) and labor force status (Inactive and
Active), China, 2015 (A); 2040 under TFR = 0.8 scenario (B); 2040 under TFR = 1.7 scenario (C).
Fig. 2. Projected dependency ratios according to two TFRs, China, 2015 to 2070 (2015 = 1). ADR: (population <15 and population 65+)/population 15–64.
LFDR: Inactive/Active. PWLFDR: Inactive/Active weighted by productivity (SI Appendix).
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well as the potential global/geopolitical influence of the country.
Such qualitative challenges should, of course, be factored into any
interpretation of the models we propose here, which are based on
a reimagining of the concept of “dependency.”
We also recognize the technical limitations of our model. While
future improvement in education attainment of the adult pop-
ulation is a near certainty due to the already existing much better
education of the younger cohorts, the “demographic dividend”
(25), in terms of improving economic performance resulting from
this, also depends on institutional and other factors that facilitate
the translation of higher skills into higher productivity. In terms of
data, not knowing the true baseline TFR is a clear challenge, but
our simulations based on two widely differing assumptions show
that the derived results are robust. Of course, quality of education
is arguably as important as quantity. However, this qualitative
dimension of education is indirectly captured in the productivity-
weighted labor force, which attributes different weights by edu-
cation to workers based on their productivity (approximated with
salary). In a context in which the quality of high school education
is very poor, the difference in salary compared to those with no
high school would be minimal. This is not the case for China,
where both mean years of schooling and skills in literacy-adjusted
mean years of schooling increased rapidly from 1970 to 2015 (26).
Despite these limitations, the results illustrate that the still widely
used conventional ADR based on a one-dimensional demographic
perspective of age alone gives only a very limited, if not mis-
leading, picture compared to the multidimensional perspective,
which pays explicit consideration to labor force participation and
skills, two dimensions that are more directly linked to economic
performance than age alone. The choice of better and more rel-
evant indicators also has far-reaching implications for longer-term
economic and geopolitical considerations. Together, these will
matter for policy development because bad measures will likely
result in bad policies.
Materials and Methods
The Microsimulation Model. The projection model developed for this research
uses a microsimulation approach (27). A microsimulation model starts from a
baseline population that consists of individual actors whose characteristics
represent the composition of a given population across chosen dimensions.
These individual actors are exposed to the risk of a set of events relevant to
their state and specific to their own characteristics—death, births of a child
(which generates a new actor inside the model), moving to a different re-
gion in a country, leaving the country, achieving the next level of education,
entering or exiting the labor market, and so on. Transitions between the
particular states are determined stochastically with a random experiment
(the Monte Carlo method). Microsimulation thus allows us to not only in-
clude a larger set of dimensions than the standard multistate population
projection models but also to easily handle competing risks.
Microsimulation methods are particularly useful when heterogeneity is of
significance in the projection modeling or in the projection outcomes (28). A
multistate cohort component method can only handle a limited number of
dimensions because the number of cells for the transition matrices corre-
sponds to the multiplication of the number of categories of each dimension.
In microsimulation, each additional dimension only adds one new column in
the dataset. Furthermore, microsimulation can more easily model events for
which behaviors can be better understood at the micro level than at the
aggregated level. For instance, having had a child in the past few years could
be a major predictor for female labor force participation. At the micro level,
this predictor can easily be taken into account, as it only requires adding one
column recording the time since the last birth occurred and what value is
incremented every year without any complex modeling. The variable can
then be used in the modeling of other events using, for instance, relative
risks or logit regression parameters.
Model Properties. The microsimulation model projects the population of
China by age (5-y age groups), sex, education, and labor force status from
2015 to 2070. It is built with the Statistical Analysis System (29) and has the
following proprieties:
• Time-based: It simulates the life of all individuals from time t to t + a and
then repeats from t + a to t + 2 × a and so on up to the end of the
time span.
• Discrete time: The model only considers the population at specific points
in time (by 5-y steps) without considering what could be happening be-
tween those points.
• Stochastic: Events are modeled stochastically using random experiments
(the Monte Carlo approach), which involves comparing probability with a
random linear number from 0 to 1 in order to determine whether or not
the event occurs.
The base population is synthetically built from the Wittgenstein Centre
estimates of 2015 by age, sex, and level of education (14). The number of
individuals generated represents 0.05% of the population size correspond-
ing subgroups, with an oversampling for subgroups with a population size
lower than 10,000 in order to minimize the Monte Carlo error for smaller
populations. The resulting dataset for the starting population in 2015 has
700,000 cases. Given the size of the starting population, each simulation run
would give approximately the same result for aggregated outcomes such as
those analyzed in this paper, thus reducing the uncertainty from the Monte
Carlo process to an insignificant level. Therefore, multiple runs are not
necessary, as the prediction interval would be close to 0. Only one simulation
run is enough to produce robust results.
Since the model allows for immigration, some individuals representing
immigrants are added throughout the projection, which are generated
following the same statistical rules as the base population, according to their
characteristics and numbers established a priori in assumptions. For our
projections, about 505,000 cases for immigrants are added throughout the
projection from 2015 and 2070. When a woman gives birth, a new individual
with the same weight is added to the dataset. Thus, the number of new
individuals added from the fertility event varies according to fertility
assumptions.
Events are ordered as follows: 1) The mortality from t to t + 5 is first
applied with survival ratios by age, sex, and education. 2) Education transi-
tion rates by age, sex, and education are then used for educational shifts.
From 0 to 14, the education variable is not applied. At the age of 15 to 19,
the cohort is broken down according to the education level reached at this
age. Transition rates are then applied, and the final educational attainment
is reached at the ages of 30 to 34. 3) For those who survive, emigrants are
removed using emigration rates by age and sex. 4) Immigrants, for whom
numbers and characteristics are set a priori, are then added. 5) Births are
generated with fertility rates by age applied to the exposed population. 6)
The labor force status is finally established from age-, sex-, and education-
specific rates calculated from regression parameters.
Demographic Assumptions. Two scenarios are built concerning the TFRs: either
0.8 and 1.7 starting from 2015 and constant until 2070. All other parameters
are the same between the two scenarios. However, given that fertility impacts
the population size, the number of emigrants, which are calculated from
emigration rates by age and sex, also differs among these scenarios. In
SI Appendix, Table S1, we summarize those assumptions.
For the mortality, the migration, the fertility schedule, and the education
progress, assumptions are those from SSP2 of the Wittgenstein Centre
multistate projections (14). Those assumptions were established from sta-
tistical modeling of past trends and expert judgments, for which detailed
explanations can be found in Lutz, Butz, and KC (30) and Lutz et al. (31). This
allows for the use of already validated long-term assumptions for those
components of the projection instead of having to build them from scratch.
The life expectancy is thus assumed to continue its progression while
keeping differences by educational attainment. The mean age at birth is also
expected to increase, while the immigration is assumed to stay low volume,
thus yielding a negative net migration.
The Labor Force Participation Module. Labor force participation rates (P) are
calculated from a logit regression parameters, estimated with data from the
CGSS 2010 to 2017 (population aged 15 to 74; n = 57,411). The model is
described in Eq. 1:
logit(P) = βs,0 + βs,1AGEGR + βs,2AGEGR2 + βs,3EDU + βs,4EDU*AGEGR
+ βs,5EDU*AGEGR2. [1]
The logit of a probability corresponds to the natural logarithm of its odds.
Therefore, the logit of the participation rate (P) can be calculated from the
parameters, such as
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exp(βs,0 + βs,1AGEGR + βs,2AGEGR2 + βs,3EDU + βs,4EDU*AGEGR
+ βs,5EDU*AGEGR2)
1 + exp(βs,0 + βs,1AGEGR + βs,2AGEGR2 + βs,3EDU + βs,4EDU*AGEGR
+ βs,5EDU*AGEGR2)
. [2]
Each sex has its own set of parameters and its own intercept. The education
includes five categories: “No education” (which includes primary incomplete),
“Primary,” “Lower Secondary,” Upper Secondary,” and “Postsecondary.” The
age group is included with a quadratic function, allowing it to be modeled
with a reverse U-shape with lower participation rates for younger adults still in
school and older persons. The interaction of age and education allows the
model to take into account that the age pattern in labor force participation
varies by educational attainment. The max-rescaled R-Square is 0.365 for the
males’ model (c-statistic = 0.840) and 0.271 for the females’ one (c-statistic =
0.758). Parameters are presented in SI Appendix, Table S2.
In SI Appendix, Fig. S1, we show the predicted rates from the model by
age and education for both males and females. In general, labor force par-
ticipation rates for women are 10 to 15% lower than those of men. Women in
their 30s with postsecondary education indeed have rates that are close to
those of men. The gender gap exists mainly for individuals with lower edu-
cation as well as for older adults, as the legal retirement age is lower for
women than for men. For both males and females, rates are lower for the
populations with no education or primary education for most of adulthood,
but they become higher past the age of 60, implying that the retirement also
comes later for the low-educated population.
In the microsimulation model, those parameters are used to calculate
individuals’ probabilities of being in the labor force. The labor force status
(in or out of the labor force) is then determined with a Monte Carlo ex-
periment following Eq. 3:
P{ 1 Ft+1<Z ∼ ([0,1])
0 Ft+1 ≥ Z ∼ ([0,1]) , [3]
where Z ∼ ([0,1]) is a random number uniformly distributed between
0 and 1.
The scenarios produced in this paper assume constant parameters for labor
forceparticipation and sector of activity. At aggregated levels, thismeans that any
change in that dimension comes from changes in the population composition.
PWLFDR The PWLFDR, introduced by Marois et al. (20), divides the number of
inactives (the population out the labor force irrespectively of their age) by
the number of people in the labor force, weighted by a productivity factor
associated to their educational attainment. Eq. 4 depicts this indicator:
PWLFDR = I∑ke=1We*Ae
, [4]
where I is the inactive population; A is active population with education
level e, e = e1 (no education), . . . , e6 (postsecondary); and W is the pro-
ductivity factor associated to the education level e.
The calculation of productivity factors relies on the assumption that in a
competitive market, at an aggregated level, the average salary is a good
proxy of productivity once a statistical control is performed for demographic
variables (32, 33). They are estimated from Poisson regression parameters on
the salary variable of the CGSS 2010 to 2017, excluding the population out of
the labor force and controlling for age, sex, and year, as expressed by Eq. 5:
ln(WAGE) = β0 + β1EDU + β2AGE GR + β3SEX + β4YEAR. [5]
Productivity factors associated to education levels are estimated with the
natural exponent of β1 and are presented in SI Appendix, Table S2. The
reference category (W = 1) is set for the category upper secondary. There-
fore, a ratio of 1 would indicate there is 1 inactive per productivity equiv-
alent to upper secondary worker.
Data Availability. Model codes and parameters are available on request. The
base population and assumptions are based on the Wittgenstein Centre for
Demography and Global Human Capital population estimates (http://dataexplorer.
wittgensteincentre.org/wcde-v2/) and the Chinese General Social Survey (http://cgss.
ruc.edu.cn/).
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